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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
January Term-1933 
EZRA J. FJELDSTED, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corpora-
tion; ORA BUNDY, W. J. RACK-
HAM, and FRED E. WILLIAMS as 
City Commissioners of said City; 
HEBER J. HEINER, City Treasurer 
of said City; and J. C. LITTLE-
FIELD, Clty Recorder of said City, 
Defendants. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Counsel for defendants has, with commendable frank-
ness, stated the facts as strongly against defendants as is 
permissable from the pleadings. It is, therefore, not nec-
essary, as we view it, to make any further statement of the 
case. 
The principal issue raised by the pleadings is correctly 
set forth in Counsel's brief at page __ ~3/ __ as follows: 
"If the proposed bond issue is subject to the 
Constitutional provisions imposing limitations upon 
the power of Cities of the second class as to issu-
ance of bonds or incurrence of indebtedness, or to 
the provisions of the budget laws, the ordinance is 
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void, the city commissioners have exceeded their 
powers and the writ requested should be made per-
manent." 
We shall attempt to treat this subject in the same order 
as Counsel for defendant leaving for final discussion the 
so-called "technical objections." 
ARGUMENT 
I 
"Has a Utah municipality power, under statute or 
otherwise, to authorize the issuance of bonds as contemplat-
ed? It is to be observed that Ogden City intends to issue 
bonds in the sum of $645,000.00, and sell the same for the 
purpose of obtaining funds to improve its water works sys-
tem. Chap. 25, Laws Utah, 1917, Sees. 792-794, as amend-
ed, is the only statutory provision expressly authorizing the 
city to issue bonds for that purpose. Defendant concedes, 
as he must, that the attempted issuance of bonds does not 
come within these provisions, hence the same may be ex-
cluded from further consideration. 
Counsel says, however, that Sec. 570X2, 570X6, and 
570X75 gives cities either express power to issue these 
bonds, or if not there is implied power granted therein. This 
calls for a careful analysis of these provisions. Sec. 57GX2 
gives cities power to appropriate money for corporate pur-
poses only, and to provide for payment of its debts. The 
powers therein granted authorize a City to appropriate 
from its general fund money for corporate purposes only, 
and to provide for payment of its debts from the same 
source. The power to purchase property, to improve the 
same and do all other things in relation thereto as a nat-
• 
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ural person also implies the use of money collected by it 
from general taxes. In other words, this section authorizes 
the expenditure of its general fund for specific purposes, 
but nothing is said about borrowing money or issuing 
bonds. Such power cannot be implied from a power to pur-
chase property. Van Eaton vs. Sidney, 231 NW 4757. 
Sec. 570X6 authorizes a city to borrow money on the 
credit of the corporation for corporate purposes in the man-
ner and extent allowed by the constitution and laws and to 
issue warrants and bonds therefore, and further provides 
for the payment of interest and sinking funds. 
r;his statute is passed pursuant to Sees. 3 and ·1, Art. 
14. of the constitution of Utah, expressly conferring au-
thority to incur an indebtedness within the limitations there-
in prescribed. It is to be observed that this section author-
izes the city to borrow money on the credit of the corpora-
tion. This means that a City is given power to borrow 
money when it pledges its general credit to pay the same. 
In this c3 .. se counsel contends that the city is not borrowing 
moue;.' on its genwral credit, therefore he is not bringing him-
self within the provisions of this section. Defendant can-
not be heard to say that section 570X6 authorizes the bor-
rowing of money in excess of the taxes for the current year 
:'cn'j. the i\'\,uanee of bonds therefore when the credit of the 
l'Orporation is not given as an assurance of payment. This 
>'·ection authorizes the borrowing of money and the issuance 
of bonds provided it is on the credit of the corporation and 
tl1e same is not in excess of the taxes for the current year, 
or if in excess, that the same has been authorized by vote 
of the taxpayers. 
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Sec. 570X75 authorizes the purchase or construction of 
water works. There is, however, no provision for borrow-
ing money or issuing bonds. Therefore, this section only 
grants the power to purchase and no doubt carries the im-
plied power to use the general funds of the city to pay for 
the same, or to issue bonds in accordance with Sees. 792-794, 
but the mere power to purchase does not give the power to 
incur an indebtedness in excess of the general revenue, nor 
to issue bonds. 
McQuillan 2nd edition, volume 6, Sec. 2436 says: 
"In considering the legality of a proposed bond 
issue, courts construe the constitution and statutes 
more strictly than they are construed in determining 
the validiy of bonds already issued and disposed of." 
Sec. 2437 says: 
"If inherent power to issue does not exist a 
municipality may issue bonds only when duly em-
powered." 
Sec. 2437 says : 
"At present it is the law in most of the states 
and in the Supreme Court of the United States that 
municipal corporations have no power to issue bonds 
unless expressly authorized so to do." 
And that page 138 the authority says: 
"Moreover it is usually held that authority to 
issue bonds can be conferred only by language which 
leaves no reasonable doubt of an intention to grant 
it and if the intention of a statute purporting to au-
thorize the issuance of bonds is doubtful, the doubt 
will be resolved against the authority to issue bonds. 
• 
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And Sec. 2443 says: 
"Limitations as to indebtedness usually apply to 
bond issues and when they do to validate the bonds 
they must be observed." 
While there are many cases cited we might call atten-
tion to the following: Van Eaton vs. Town of Sidney, 
231 N. M. 475, 71 A. L. R. 802. Mote vs. Carlisle, 233 N. W. 
695. Christensen vs. Town of Kimballton, 236 N. W. 406. 
Express power to purchase property does not include 
the power to issue bonds. Hazel Hurst vs. Mayes, 51 S. 
890. See also 44 C. J. 1177, Sec. 4141. Kaw Valley Dis-
trict vs. Kansas City, 239 Pac. 760. The power to borrow 
money does not grant the power to issue bonds. Brenham 
vs. German, American bank, 144 U. S. 173. 
Bonds cannot be issued under implied powers. Van 
Eaton vs. Sidney, 231 N. W. 475. 
Counsel says that this court has held in the Barnes 
case that a city may incur such a debt, payable in such a 
manner without regard to limitations affecting other debts. 
We submit that the Barnes case does not go to that 
exent. It does hold that the contract therein made did not 
create an indebtedness. Therefore, the constitutional pro-
hibitations against incurring indebtedness in excess of cur-
rent taxes did not apply. It logically follows that if Lehi 
City did not incur an indebtedness, then it did not borrow 
money. Therefore the question of power to borrow and 
issue bonds as evidence of the indebtedness did not arise 
in the Barnes case. Here Ogden City is borrowing money 
and issuing bonds. True the bonds are payable out of a 
special fund, but the city, nevertheless, is borrowing money 
and issuing bonds. Unfortunately the Barnes case does not 
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specifically discuss the question suggested here. It holds, 
in line with some other cases, that the act therein attempt~ 
was not in violation of the constiutional prohibitations 
against incurring an indebtedness in excess of current 
taxes without submitting the same to a vote and held that 
the same was not prohibited under the constitution. How-
ever, assuming that the act is not prohibited under the 
constitution, still the further quesion arises: Is there any 
power expressly or impliedly conferred to do the act in 
question? The Barnes case seems to assume that if not 
prohibited by the constitution the city has the authority 
to do the act, but does not refer to any provision of our stat-
ute giving the city the power to make the contract irrespec-
tive of the constitutional provision. 
Counsel says page ____ ~ .. : 
"The constitution limits the power to incur in-
debtedness, but is silent as to the matter otherwise. 
The statutes are silent as to the extent to which such 
self liqnidative borrowings may go. And nowhere 
is there to be found a provision limiting the manner 
in which such bonds may be issued unless it is to be 
found in Chap. 25, Title 16, Laws 1917 ." 
We submit that Counsel's argument is unsound. The 
cases and text above cited all say it is not a question of 
whether the statutes limit the power, but it is rather a ques-
tion as to whether the statute grants the power because ad-
mittedly a municipality has no power except as given to it 
by the legislature. The question here presented suggests 
the wisdom of that policy. Here a city is the owner of a 
waterworks system in which it has invested approximately 
$2,000,000.00. A commission of three men now propose to 
borrow $645,000.00 and to tie up the income from all the 
• 
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property for years in advance, use the entire income to pay 
off the $645,000.00, increase the rates, force the city to pay 
the outstanding bonded indebtedness of one and a half mil-
lion dollars from general tax-action without realizing a dol-
lar from the income of the system to pay the same. We 
respectfully submit that the legislature never intended to 
vest such powers in the hands of two of its three commis-
sioners and unless such power can be found in the statutes 
the same cannot be authorized. 
II 
"Is the contemplated improvement one of a character 
whieh warrants application of the rule that self liquidating 
bonds are not within the scope of constitutional and statu-
tory limitations.'' 
We agree with counsel that the Barnes case would seem 
to be decisive of this question against the contention of pe-
titioner. However, we desire to discuss the question in the 
light of some recent decisions. The case of Garrett vs. 
Swanton, 13t P. 2nd 725 and cases therein cited recognize 
the familiar rule contended for by defendant and adopted 
by this court in the Barnes case: 
"That where the indebtedness or liability is 
made payable solely out of a specified fund created 
entirely from the income of the water system, and 
is not a general obligation of the city, the constitu-
tional provision has not been violated." 
And then holds that this same doctrine prevails in 
California. California is not, as asserted by counsel, com-
I~itted to the minority rule respecting the so-called "Spe-
cial Fund Doctrine," but the court then proceeds to limit 
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the "Special Fund Doctrine" and calls attention to the fact 
that there are at least two well settled limitations or ex-
ceptions to this doctrine. 
(a) "A municipality incurs an indebtedness or 
liability when by the terms of the transaction it is 
obligated directly or indirectly to feed the special 
fund from the general or other revenues in addition 
to those arising solely from the specific improve-
ment contemplated." 
(b) "That a municipality incurs an indebted-
ness or liability when by the terms of the transac-
tion the municipality may suffer a loss if the special 
fund is not sufficient to pay the obligation incur-
red." 
The court approved these limitations and held that the 
contract involved came within either or both. The facts of 
that case seem to be in point. The City of Santa Cruz own-
ed its own water works system acquired with money raised 
from the sale of its own water works bonds. Part of these 
bonds are still outstanding and constitute a general obli-
gation of the City. All monies collected from the operation 
of the water works system are placed in a special fund. 
An ordinance provides that the fund is to be used exclu-
sively for the operation, maintenance, construction, im-
provement, extension, enlargement and up keep of the water 
system, and for the payment of any bonded indebtedness 
now existing or which may be hereafter created for the 
operation, maintenance, etc., of the system. 
Up to this point the cases appear to be identical, the 
only difference we perceive is the one suggested by coun-
sel that the ordinance therein provided for the application 
of the fund to the payment of bonded indebtedness incur-
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red for acquiring the system, while the Ogden ordinance ap-
pears to leave it to the discretion of the commission wheth-
er or not the funds are so applied. But we regard the at-
tempted distinction as immaterial to the point involved 
because if the fund is not used directly to pay the bonded 
indebtedness it is turned into the general fund and money 
taken from the general fund to pay the interest and create 
the sinking fund to meet the bonded indebtedness. The 
same result is accomplished, one by direct and the other by 
indirect action. (At this point it might be well to state 
parenthetically that Sec. 794 as amended by Chap. 63 laws, 
1925, seems to contemplate that while the bonds are gen-
eral obligations imposing a duty on the commission to levy 
a tax to pay the same, yet rates may be charged sufficient 
to pay the operating charges and the bonded indebtedness. 
In other words this amendment authorizes the commission 
to use the proceeds from the system to pay the bonded in-
debtedness even though the bonds constitute a general ob-
ligation.) 
The California court observes that it is not only the 
income earned by the property purchased that constitutes 
the special fund from which the payments are to be made, 
but tt-Je income from the entire system which creates such 
special fund. Hence the court concludes that while directly 
the contract provides that payments from this fund shall 
not constitue a general obligation indirectly such contract 
does create a general liability, because if the fund be de-
pleted by payments to Fairbanks Morse & Company for the 
pumping plant the fund created for the payment of interest 
and principal on the bonds will be depleted and since such 
bonds are a general obligation, the taxpayers must at all 
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times be ready to feed the special fund if the income is not 
sufficie11t to pay the contract and the bonds. Therefore 
the taxpay~rs became indirectly liable to pay this obliga-
tion. 
The court concludes that if the "Special Fund Doctrine" 
i~ extended to such a case the subterfuge would go far to 
effectually wipe out the purpose and intent of the consti-
tutional provision. The court then proceeds to cite cases 
supporting the rule and dismisses any attempt to distinguish 
from the cases cited because of the provisions of the ordi-
nance and concludes the argument with the following nota-
tion from the Wilder vs. Murphy case. 
"The contract in question requires the use of 
the earnings of the entire property. In Bell vs. 
City of Fayette, supra, the court said, "It will be 
noted that the distinction is whether any other prop-
ert.v of the city is liable for the payments or whether 
the purchase price of such improvements is to be 
paid for wholly out of the earnings of the improve-
ment" and then says: The logic of these cases, and 
of the case cited by the Federal Circuit Court seems 
unescapable. The contract here involved is not pay-
able solely from the income of the improvement con-· 
templated, but is payable from the revenues of the 
entire water system. Part of those revenues can, 
and in fact must be applied to the payment of the 
interest and principal on the bonds which is a gen-
eral obligation of the city." 
If the attempted distinction arising from the ordinance 
is of any importance the subsequent cases referred to, as 
well as the cases cited in the Garrett case cannot be distin-
guished because of any provision in the ordinance. 
An interesting situation prevails in North Dakota. In 
the case of Lang vs. Cavalier, 228 N. W. 819, decided Jan. 
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15, 1930, the court adopted the so-called majority rule and 
held that a contract to purchase a plant and pay for the 
same out of itl" revenues was not prohibited by the consti-
tution. Th({n in the case of Hess vs. Watertown, 232 N. W. 
53, decided Sept. 22, 1930, the court, just as in California, 
limited the doctrine and held that proposed bonds for addi-
tion to existing municipal electric plant payable from rev-
enues of the entire plant issued without election was invalid. 
The case carefully distinguishes it from the Lang case and 
reviews the authorities very carefully. The facts in the 
Hess case seem to be identical as are also the facts in the 
Federal case cited in the Garrett case (55 Fed. 2nd 560). 
It is further interesting to note that in the Barnes case 
reference is made to the case of Kosch vs. Miller, 135 N. E. 
813. Thiil case seems to recognize the limitation heretofore 
referred to because it discusses some cases and then dis-
tinguishes them on the principal that here they were only 
pledging the revenues received exclusively from the im-
provement while in the other cases cited, the obligation was 
made a lien on the property of the municipality. And the 
case of the City of Joliet, 62 N. E. 861, referred to, clearly 
recognizes this distinction; while the city there mortgaged 
its existing water works, a condition not found in the Og-
den ease; it also pledged the whole of its income and on this 
latter question the court says: 
"In addition to mortgaging the existing system, 
the ordinance proposes to take the income now de-
rived from it, amounting to about $10,000.00 a year, 
and devote it to the payment of the certificates. 
This is existing property and income of the city de-
rived annually from the present s1~em of water-
works, independent of the extension, and in no man-
ner resulting fro mor depencling upon it. The City 
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is to lose property in the form of established income 
for the purpose of paying the certificates. 
This same distinction is clearly recognized in the recent 
case of Bell vs. Fayette, 28 S. W. 2nd 356. Th9> court says: 
"Test whether city's contract for purchase of 
machinery is within constitutional limitations of in-
debtedness, is whether price is to be paid wholly 
out of earnings on the improvement or otherwise." 
Counsel for defendant admits that the facts of these 
cases fit our case with respect to inability of the city 
to segregate the income of the contemplated inprovement 
from the balance of the system, and also that for the past 
six years the revenue from the system, as now constituted, 
has produced net revenue of from $55,000.00 to $90,000.00 
per year which sum can be, and under the provisions of 
Chapter 63, laws 1925, should be applied to the payment 
of interest and principal on the bonds. 
We frankly admit that it would appear from reading 
the Barnes case that the equipment purchased was to 
extend and improve a present plant, rather than to construct 
a new plant. In other words, that the Barnes case should 
have come within the limitation now urged by us. However, 
the writer has read all of the cases cited in the Barnes 
case and has carefully studied the Barnes opinion, and 
after doing so has come to the conclusion that this so 
called limitation of the "Special Fund Doctrine" was not 
called to the attention of its court and not considered by 
it at that time. In practically all of the cases cited the 
facts did not bring the case within the limitation contended 
for, or, like the·Barnes case, does not discuss these limita-
tions. Therefore, we feel justified in saying that rio doubt 
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this phase of the question was never suggested to this 
court. About the only case cited which does seem to discuss 
this question is the case of Bolling Green vs. Kirby, 295 
SW 1004. It is interesting to note that most of the cases 
which have limited the doctrine have been decided since 
the Barnes case. This is particularly true of the California, 
North Dakota and Federal cases. If this court feels, as 
the California and North Dakota courts, that the "logic 
of these C':tses seems unescapable" then it should not hesitate 
to place this limitation upon the "Special Fund Doctrine" 
broadly approved in the Barnes case. vVe believe that the 
courts, as expressed in these recent decisions, are finding 
it necessary to limit this doctrine. We desire to be of 
assistance to this court in presenting this matter and so 
we desire to state frankly that Colorado has recently been 
asked to adopt the California and North Dakota doctrine, 
but has refused to do so. See Searle vs. Town of Hartun, 
271 Pac. 630. This case attempts to distinguish between 
a pledge of the property and a pledge of the income. We 
submit that the distinction is one of degree only but on 
principle there can be no distinction because both are 
property belonging to the city and it ought to make no 
difference whether one or both is pledged, in either case 
it constitutes an indirect obligation. We appreciate the 
fact that courts are reluctant to overrule prior decisions, 
however, we do not think this is necessary to sustain our 
position. The Barnes case may be good law in so far as 
it applies to the general proposition accepting the Special 
Fund Doctrine and after all that is what was intended by 
that decision, but the effect of this decision should be 
limited to those cases where the entire proceeds from the 
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improvement can be segregated and applied to liquidation 
of the indebtedness and not extended to cases like the 
present. We might cite a few additional cases principally 
for the value of their argument against this authority: 
kachary vs. Wagoner, 292 P.ac. 345; Miller vs. City of Buhl,, 
284 Pac. 834. We believe that the foregoing authorities 
pretty well covers the field so far as our investigation bas 
disclosed. 
III 
"So called technical objections." 
At this point permit us to state frankly that these 
so called technical objections have been suggested by approv-
ing bond attorneys, including counsel for R. F. C. and for 
that reason it is desired that this court expressly approve or 
disapprove these various objections in order to settle the 
matter, nott only for the benefit of Ogden City, but otber 
municipalities in this state which may become vitally 
interested in this decision. We will take up these objections 
in the order suggested by us in our petition, Par. 13. 
(a) Assuming the city has authority to borrow 
$645,000.00 as proposed, and issue bonds for the same. If 
the issuance of these proposed bonds do not come within the 
provision of Section 794 as amended, because the same 
does not constitute a general obligation of the city, then 
the provisions found therein restricting the power to sell 
for not less than their face value does not apply. It seems 
to be the law that a sale by a municipality of its bonds for 
less than their par value is permissable when expressly 
authorized or not prohibited by statute or charter. Mc-
quillan 2nd edition, Vol. 2, Sec. 2463 44 CJ 1217 Sec. 4188. 
• 
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We do not find any other:prohibitation in the statute regard-
ing sale of bonds for less than par except Sec. 794. 1N e are 
therefore unable to find any authority prohibiting the sale 
of these bonds for less than par unless the provision of 
section 794 applies. 
(b) The answer to this objection is similar to (a). 
If the contemplated bond issue is not an indebtedness within 
the provision of 792-794, then the provisions of Sec. 794, 
as amended, Chap. 63 laws 1925, requiring the levying of 
taxes to meet any deficiency does not apply. On the othet· 
hand if these provisions do apply, then the objection is well 
taken. 
(c) This objection is really a further argument for 
the rule prescribing a limitation upon the "Special Fund 
Doctrine." By the terms of the ordinance Ogden City agree:,; 
to pay into this fund a reasonable value of all water used 
by it. This money will come from the general fund and 
thereby indirectly creates a liability against the city and 
constitutes other revenues from which the fund is payable, 
because before the contemplated improvement the income 
was paid into the general fund. Now the city obligates 
itself to take money from its general fund to pay for water 
used by it. Clearly other property of the city is thereby 
rendered liable for the payment of the bond and other 
revenues, in addition to those arising from the improvement, 
contemplated, is used to pay for the improvements. 
(d) This calls for a construction of Art. 13, Sec. 1 
of the constitution which provides as follows: "The fiscal 
year shall begin on the first day of January unless changed 
by the legislature." Sec. 670 provides; "The fiscal yea1· of 
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cities shall commence on the first day of January." Counsel 
claims that this provision does not apply to cities. In 
this contention we think he is mistaken. Art. 13 deals 
with revenue and taxation. Such subject is germane to 
cities and this court has held that under the constitution 
and Sec. 670 the fiscal year of all cities begins January 1, 
and ends December 31. Dickenson vs. Salt Lake City, 57 
Utah 530-195 Pac. 110. By Section 10 of the ordinance 
in question Ogden City covenants for the purpose of servic-
ing the bonds that its fiscal year shall continue to be the 
same as the calendar year until all of said bonds are paid 
up and retired. The authority to change the fiscal year 
rests entirely with the legislature. Ogden City cannot 
bind it and clearly this provision of the ordinance is 
absolutely void. 
( e-f-g-h) All of these objections deal with the pt·opo-
sition heretofore discussed. If the "Special Fund Doctrine" 
does not apply to the facts in this case, then clearly each 
of these objections are well taken. If, however, this doc-
trine does apply, then under the rule announced in the 
Barnes case, none of these objections are tenable because 
there is no indebtedness within the meaning of the Constitu-
tional limitation. 
(i) We submit that the city cannot pledge the net 
revenues of such water system unless express authority can 
be found authorizing or empowering the city to pledge or 
mortgage its property. vVe have searched the statutes, 
but can find no authority granting a city commission power 
to pledge property belonging to the municipalities. That 
such cannot be done, see Hight vs. City of Harrisonville, 
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41 SW 2nd 155. City of Campbell vs. Arkansas Power, 
55 Fed. 2nd. 560. Van Eaton vs. Sidney, 231 NW 475. 
Note 71 ALR 828. 
(j) This raises a question somewhat similar to that 
discussed under sub-division (i). Can the City by ordinance 
create a lien on the net revenues to be subsequently earned 
from the water system? It is our contention that there 
is no authority in the statutes auhorizing or empowering 
a Ciy to create a lien upon this fund. This is akin to 
pledging its property. If there is no such authority in the 
statute, then the City is without authority to do so, and 
such attempted provision in the ordinance is void. 
(k) This raises the question whether or not the 
ordinance, together with section 162 of the Revised Ordi-
nances (referred to in the petition) are valid. It is our 
position that there is no authority authorizing the city 
to create a special fund into which a part of its revenue 
shall be paid. Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 1925, provides that 
the revenues may be used for the payment of the bonds, 
but nowhere is there any provision in the statute authorizing 
or empowering the City Commission to create a special fund, 
and to place the earnings of the system into that fund. 
(I) This objection is closely analagous to subdivision 
(c). We contend that it is further evidence of an indirect 
obligation to be paid out of other revenues than the income 
derived from thte water works system. Here again there 
is no express authority authorizing the City to provide for 
the accumulation in the special fund, as proposed, and 
again we say that the ordinance attempts to permit acts 
not authorized by legislative sanction. 
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(m) The statute makes no provisions as to the form 
of the bonds, and the question naturally arises, can a city 
under authority to issue bonds, issue registered bonds, 
coupon bonds, convertible bands, registered coupon bonds, 
or is the city authorized to issue only registered bonds'! 
For a discussion of the various kinds of bonds, see McQuillan, 
Vol. 6. Sec. 2423-2425. It is to be observed that the author 
refers to the kind of bond proposed here as an ''mongrel," 
and says that it is not usually issued by a municipality. 
It seems to us that in the absence of legislative authority, 
a city ought not to be permitted to issue other than regis-
tered bonds, as these are the safest kind of bonds to be 
issued. 
(n) The constitution requires cities to charge a rea-
sonable rate for water service, Sec. 6 Art. 11. The ordinance 
in question purports to bind the city, in favor of the 
bondholders, to fix a rate sufficiently high so that the 
same will pay the operating and maintenance charges, the 
interest on the bonded indebtedness, and retire the bonds. 
In addition to this the city also covenants to set aside 
sufficient funds to c1·eate a guarantee fund for one year. 
If such a fund required the charging of a rate entirely 
out of proportion to the serviee rendered, it would be pro-
hibited by the constitution. We do not believe that it was 
the intent of the framers of the cnstitution in using the 
term "reasonable rate" to mean that a city may incur an 
indebtedness without limitation to purchase or construct 
a water system and then make a charge sufficiently high 
to pay for the same in a limited number of years and ca1l 
that a reasonable rate. We think the framers meant by the 
term "reasonable rate," a rate commensurate with that 
/ 
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charged by other localities, or a rate which is commensurate 
with the service rendered. 
(o) We do not believe that the city has authority 
to provide in an ordinance that the same shall constitute 
a contract binding upon the city and subsequent administra-
tions. The effect of this ordinance is to take from the subse-
quent Commission te power to control, change, or modify 
the provisions of the ordinance. Here again the authority 
must be found in the statutes. We do not find any statutory 
provision warranting such authority. 
In conclusion, permit us to state that many of these 
propositions are so closely allied that it is impossible to 
segregate the same, and a general discussion applies to 
many of these obligations. 
As a further ground for our contention, we desire 
to briefly refer to Section 6, Article 11 of the constitution 
which prohbits a municipal corporation from directly or 
indirectly leasing, selling, alienating, or disposing of any 
water works, water rights, etc., and providing that the 
same shall be preserved, maintained and operated for the 
benefit of the inhabitants at a reasonable charge. The 
ordinance in question in effect ties the hands of the adminis-
tration for a long period of time. While the water works 
system itself is not pledged, yet the revenue derived there-
from is pledged, and the city covenants to charge a rate 
sufficiently high to pay all operating expenses, and interest 
on this bonded indebtedness, and also to retire the bonds. 
No one knows what that rate will be. It will obviously 
depend upon the amount of water consumed. It is, however, 
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probable that the rate will be extremely high. Is not the 
transaction, when viewed as a whole, in violation of section 
6 of the constitution? And does not the constitution above 
referred to really mean that no water works system can 
be tied up, or the funds pledged or encumbered in the man-
ner proposed, but rather that the same shall always be free, 
unencumbered and unhampered by any contracts, pledgeH 
or ordinances seeking to, indirectly, at least, handicap the 
inhabitants in the enjoyment of the water works system 
belonging to the city? 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER and YOUNG. 
